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Abstract
Several techniques have been proposed to detect vulnerable
Spectre gadgets in widely deployed commercial software.
Unfortunately, detection techniques proposed so far rely on
hand-written rules which fall short in covering subtle vari-
ations of known Spectre gadgets as well as demand a huge
amount of time to analyze each conditional branch in soft-
ware. Since it requires arduous effort to craft new gadgets
manually, the evaluations of detection mechanisms are based
only on a handful of these gadgets.
In this work, we employ deep learning techniques for auto-
mated generation and detection of Spectre gadgets. We first
create a diverse set of Spectre-V1 gadgets by introducing per-
turbations to the known gadgets. Using mutational fuzzing,
we produce a data set with more than 1 million Spectre-V1
gadgets which is the largest Spectre gadget data set built to
date. Next, we conduct the first empirical usability study of
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) for creating as-
sembly code without any human interaction. We introduce
SpectreGAN which leverages masking implementation of
GANs for both learning the gadget structures and generat-
ing new gadgets. This provides the first scalable solution to
extend the variety of Spectre gadgets.
Finally, we propose FastSpec which builds a classifier with
the generated Spectre gadgets based on the novel high dimen-
sional Neural Embedding technique BERT. For case studies,
we demonstrate that FastSpec discovers potential gadgets in
OpenSSL libraries and Phoronix benchmarks. Further, Fast-
Spec offers much greater flexibility and much faster classi-
fication compared to what is offered by the existing tools.
Therefore FastSpec can be used for gadget detection in large-
scale projects.
1 Introduction
A new era of microarchitectural attacks began with newly dis-
covered Spectre [26] and Meltdown [32] attacks which may
be exploited to exfiltrate confidential information through sub-
tle channels during speculative and out-of-order executions.
Spectre attacks target vulnerable code patterns called gadgets,
which leak information during speculatively executed instruc-
tions. While the initial variants of Spectre [26] exploit con-
ditional and indirect branches, Koruyeh et al. [27] proposes
another Spectre variant obtained by poisoning the entries in
Return-Stack-Buffers (RSBs). Moreover, new Spectre-type
attacks [7, 27] are implemented against the SGX environment
and even remotely over the network [54]. These attacks show
the applicability of Spectre attacks in the wild.
Unfortunately, chip vendors try to patch the leakages one-
by-one with microcode updates rather than fixing the flaws by
changing their hardware designs. Therefore, developers rely
on automated malware analysis tools to eliminate mistakenly
placed Spectre gadgets in their programs. The proposed detec-
tion tools mostly implement taint analysis [66] and symbolic
execution [15,65] to identify potential gadgets in benign appli-
cations. However, the methods proposed so far are have two
shortcomings: (1) the scarcity of Spectre gadgets prevents the
comprehensive evaluation of the tools, (2) the scanning time
increases drastically with increasing binary file sizes. Thus,
there is a need for a robust and fast analysis tool that can au-
tomatically discover potential Spectre gadgets in large-scale
commercial software.
Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques are applied
to automate challenging tasks in natural language and text
processing [48]. Later, NLP techniques have been applied for
security as well, such as in network traffic [49] and vulner-
ability analysis [50]. Such applications leverage word [39]
or paragraph [30] embedding techniques to learn the vector
representations of the text. The success of these techniques
heavily depend on the large data sets which ease to train
scalable and robust NLP models. However, for Spectre, for
instance, the number of available gadgets is only 15, which
makes it crucial to create new Spectre gadgets before building
an NLP-based detection tool.
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [14] are a type
of generative models, which aim to produce new examples by
learning the distribution of training instances in an adversarial
setting. Since adversarial learning makes GANs more robust
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and applicable in real-world scenarios, GANs have become
quite popular in recent years with applications ranging from
generating images [42, 68] to text-to-image translation [51]
etc. While the early applications of GANs focused on com-
puter vision, implementing the same techniques in Natural
Language Processing (NLP) tasks poses a challenge due to
the lack of continuous space in text. To overcome this obsta-
cle, various mathematical GAN-based techniques have been
proposed to achieve better success in generating human-like
sentences [12, 16]. However, it is still unclear whether GANs
can be used to create application-specific code snippets for
use in the context of computer security. Additionally, each
computer language has a different structure, semantics, and
other features that make it more difficult to generate meaning-
ful snippets for a specific application.
Neural vector embeddings [30,39] which are used to obtain
the vector representations of words, have proven extremely
useful in NLP applications. Such embedding techniques also
enable one to perform vector operations in high dimensional
space while preserving the meaningful relations between sim-
ilar words. Typically, supervised techniques apply word em-
bedding tools as an initial step to obtain the vector embed-
ding of each token, and then, build a supervised model on
top. For instance, BERT [9] was proposed by the Google AI
team to learn the relations between different words in a sen-
tence by applying a self-attention mechanism [63]. BERT has
exhibited superior performance compared to previous tech-
niques [38, 57] when combined with bi-directional learning.
Furthermore, the attention mechanism improves GPU utiliza-
tion while learning long sequences more efficiently. Recently,
BERT-like architectures are shown to be capable of modeling
high-level programming languages [13, 29]. However, it is
still unclear whether it will be effective to model a low-level
programming language, such as Assembly language, and help
in building more robust malware detection tools which is the
goal of this paper.
Our Contributions. Our contributions consist of two parts.
First, we focus on increasing the number and diversity of
Spectre gadgets with mutational fuzzing. We start with 15
examples [25] and produce 1 million gadgets by introducing
various perturbations to the existing gadgets. Then, we pro-
pose SpectreGAN, which learns the distribution of 1 million
Spectre gadgets to generate new gadgets with higher accuracy.
The generated gadgets are evaluated in terms of both semantic
and microarchitectural aspects to verify their diversity. The
gadgets that are not detected by detection tools are introduced
as novel gadgets.
In the second part, we introduce FastSpec which is a high
dimensional neural embedding derived from BERT, and use
the embedding to obtain a highly accurate and fast classifier
for Spectre gadgets. We train FastSpec with generated gadgets
and achieve 0.99 F-1 score in the test phase. Further, we
apply FastSpec on the OpenSSL libraries and the Phoronix
benchmarks to show that FastSpec is capable of detecting the
hidden gadgets while significantly decreasing the analysis
time compared to oo7 and Spectector in large-scale software.
In summary,
• We extend 15 base Spectre examples to 1 million gadgets
via mutational fuzzing,
• We propose SpectreGAN which leverages conditional
GANs to create new Spectre gadgets by learning the distri-
bution of existing Spectre gadgets in a scalable way,
• We show that both mutational fuzzing and SpectreGAN
create diverse and novel gadgets which are not detected by
oo7 and Spectector tools,
• We introduce FastSpec which is based on supervised neural
word embeddings to identify the potential gadgets in be-
nign applications orders of magnitude faster than rule-based
methods.
Outline The paper is organized as follows: First, the back-
ground on transient execution attacks and NLP are given
in Section 2. Then, the related work is given in Section 3.
Next, we introduce both fuzzing-based and SpectreGAN gen-
eration techniques in Section 4. A new Transformer-based
detection tool namely, FastSpec is proposed in Section 5. Fi-
nally, we conclude the paper with discussions in Section 6
and conclusion in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 Transient Execution Attacks
In order to keep the pipeline occupied at all times, modern
CPUs have sophisticated microarchitectural optimizations to
predict the control flow and data dependencies, where some
instructions can be executed ahead of time in the transient
domain. However, the control-flow predictions are not 100%
accurate, which might cause to execute some instructions
wrongly. These instructions cause pipeline flush once they
are detected and their results are never committed. Interest-
ingly, microarchitectural optimizations make it possible to
leak secrets. The critical time period before the flush happens
is commonly referred to the transient domain.
There are two classes of attacks in the transient domain [5].
The first one is called Meltdown-type attacks [4, 32, 52, 56,
61, 62] which exploit delayed permission checks and lazy
pipeline flush in the re-order buffer. The other class is Spectre-
type attacks [19, 24, 26, 27, 34] that exploit the speculative
execution. As most Meltdown-type attacks are fixed in most
microarchtiectures and the Spectre-type attacks are still appli-
cable to a wide range of targets [5], i.e. Intel, AMD, and ARM
CPUs, we will focus our attention to Spectre-V1 attacks.
Some researchers proposed new designs requiring change
in the silicon level [23,28,70] while others proposed software
solutions to mitigate transient execution attacks [45, 60]. Al-
though these mitigations are effective against Spectre-type
2
attacks, majority of them are not being used because either
they degrade the performance drastically [6] or the current
hardware has no support. Hence, Spectre-type attacks are not
completely resolved yet and finding an efficient countermea-
sure is still an open problem.
2.1.1 Spectre
As a typical software consists of branches and instruction/data
dependencies, modern CPUs have components for predict-
ing the outcome of conditional branches to execute the in-
structions speculatively. These components are called branch
prediction units (BPU) which use a history table and other
components to make predictions on branch outcomes.
1 void victim_function(size_t x){
2 if(x < size)
3 temp &= array2[array1[x] * 512];
4 }
Listing 1: Spectre-V1 C Code
In Spectre attacks, a user fills the history table with mali-
cious entries such that the BPU makes a misprediction. Then,
the CPU executes a set of instructions speculatively. As a re-
sult of misprediction, the sensitive data can be leaked through
microarchitectural components for instance by encoding the
secret to the cache lines to establish a covert channel. For ex-
ample, in the Spectre gadget in Listing 1, the 2nd line checks
whether the user input x is in the bound of array1. In a nor-
mal execution environment, if the condition is satisfied, the
program retrieves xth element of array1 and a multiple of the
retrieved value (512) is used as an index to access the data in
array2. However, under some conditions, the size variable
might not be present in the cache. In such occurrences, instead
of waiting for size to be available, the CPU executes the next
instructions speculatively to eliminate unnecessary stalls in
the pipeline. When size becomes available, the CPU checks
whether it made a correct prediction or not. If the prediction
was wrong, the CPU rolls back and executes the correct path.
Although the results of speculatively executed instructions
are not observable in architectural components, the access to
the array2 leaves a footprint in the cache, which makes it
possible to leak the data through side-channel analysis.
There are a number of known Spectre variants: Spectre-
V1 (bounds check bypass), Spectre-V2 (branch target injec-
tion), Spectre-RSB [27, 34] (return stack buffer speculation),
and Spectre-V4 [19] (speculative store bypass). We focus on
Spectre-V1 as our primary goal since there is no effective
solution other than inserting fence instructions after condi-
tional branches. On the other hand, Spectre-V2 is mitigated
by flushing BTB across context switches. Moreover, unlike
Spectre-V2 gadgets, to stop exploit in Spectre-V1, the vulner-
able code segment needs to be found. Thus, a detection tool
for finding gadgets is needed.
2.2 Natural Language Processing
2.2.1 seq2seq Architecture
A major drawback of DNNs is the lack of mapping sequences
to sequences. To solve this problem, a new approach called
seq2seq [57] was introduced to learn sequence-to-sequence
relations. The seq2seq architecture consists of encoder and de-
coder units. Both units leverage multi-layer Long Short Term
Memory (LSTM) structures where the encoder produces a
fixed dimension encoder vector. The encoder vector repre-
sents the information learned from the input sequence. Then,
the decoder unit is fed with the encoder vector to predict the
mapping sequence of the input sequence. After the end of the
sequence token is produced by the decoder, the prediction
phase stops. The seq2seq structure is commonly used in chat-
bot engine [46] since sequences with different lengths can be
mapped to each other.
2.2.2 Generative Adversarial Networks
A specialized method of training generative models was pro-
posed by Goodfellow et al. [14] which is called generative ad-
versarial networks (GANs). The generative models are trained
with a separate discriminator model under an adversarial set-
ting. In [14], the training of generative model is defined as,
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) = Ex∼pdata(x)[log D(x)]
+Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))].
(1)
In Equation 1, the generator G and the discriminator D are
trained in such a way that D, as a regular binary classifier,
tries to maximize its confidence D(x) on real data x, while
minimizing D(G(z)) on generated samples by the G. At the
same time, G tries to maximize the confidence of discrimina-
tor D(G(z)) on generated samples G(z) and minimize D(x)
where x is the real data.
In previous works, GANs are commonly used for learning
the probability distribution of a data set pdata and generating
new data samples from the same distribution on a continuous
space, e.g., images [1, 20, 43, 47], audio signals [11].
2.2.3 MaskGAN
MaskGAN [12] is a type of conditional GAN technique
to establish a good performance out of traditional GANs.
MaskGAN is based on seq2seq architecture with an atten-
tion mechanism. Attention mechanism improves the perfor-
mance of the fixed-length encoder vector since LSTMs cause
information loss in long sequences. Each time a prediction
is made by the decoder unit, a part of the input sequence is
used instead of the encoder vector. Hence, each token in the
input sequence has a different weight on the decoder output.
The main difference of MaskGAN from other GAN-based
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text generation techniques is the token masking approach
which helps learning the missing texts in a sequence. For
this purpose, some tokens are masked that are conditioned on
the surrounding context. This technique increases the chance
of generating longer and more meaningful sequences out of
GANs.
2.2.4 Transformer and BERT
Although recurrent models with attention mechanisms learn
the representations of long sequences, attention-only models,
namely Transformer architectures [63], are shown to be highly
effective in terms of computational complexity and perfor-
mance on long-range dependencies. Similar to seq2seq archi-
tecture, Transformer architecture consists of encoder-decoder
model. The main difference of Transformer is that recurrent
models are not used in encoder or decoder units. Instead, the
encoder unit is composed of L hidden layers where each layer
has a multi-head self-attention mechanism with A attention
heads and a fully connected feed-forward network. The input
embedding vectors are fed into the multi-head attention and
the output of the encoder stack is formed by feed-forward
network which takes the output of the attention sub-layer. The
decoder unit also has L hidden layers, and it has the same sub-
layers with encoder. In addition to one multi-head attention
unit and one feed-forward network, the decoder unit has an ex-
tra multi-head attention layer that processes the encoder stack
output. In order to process the information in the sequence
order, positional embeddings are used with token embeddings
where both embedding vectors have a size of H.
Keeping the same Transformer architecture, Devlin et
al. [9] introduced a new language representation model called
BERT (Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Trans-
formers) which surpasses the state-of-the-art scores on lan-
guage representation learning. BERT is designed to pre-train
the token representation vectors of deep bidirectional Trans-
formers. For the detailed description of the architecture, we
refer the readers to [9, 63]. The heavy part of the training
is handled by processing unlabeled data in an unsupervised
manner. The unsupervised phase is called pre-training which
consists of masked language model training and next sentence
prediction procedures. The supervised phase is referred to
as fine-tuning where the model representations are further
trained with labeled data for a text classification task. Both
phases are further explained in detail for Spectre gadget de-
tection model in Section 5.
3 Related Work
3.1 Spectre attacks and detectors
Spectre Variations and Covert Channels In the first Spec-
tre study [26], two variants were introduced. While Spectre-
V1 exploits the conditional branch prediction mechanism
when a bound check is present, Spectre-V2 manipulates the in-
direct branch predictions to leak the secret. Next, researchers
discovered new variants of Spectre-based attacks. For in-
stance, a variant of Spectre focuses on poisoning Return-
Stack-Buffer (RSB) entries with the desired malicious return
addresses [27, 34]. Another variant of Spectre called "Spec-
ulative Store Bypass" [19] takes the advantage of memory
disambiguator’s prediction to create leakage. Traditionally,
secrets are leaked through cache timing differences. Then,
researchers showed that there are also other covert channels
to measure the time difference: namely using network latency
[54], port contention [3], or control flow hijack attack based
on return-oriented programming [36] to leak secret data.
Defenses against Spectre There are various detection
methods for speculative execution attacks. Taint analysis is
used in oo7 [66] software tool to detect leakages. As an alter-
native way, the taint analysis is implemented in the hardware
context to stop the speculative execution for secret depen-
dent data [53, 71]. The second method relies on symbolic
execution analysis. Spectector [15] symbolically executes the
programs where the conditional branches are treated as mis-
predicted. Furthermore, SpecuSym [18] and KleeSpectre [65]
aim to model cache usage with symbolic execution to detect
speculative interference which is based on Klee symbolic exe-
cution engine. Following a different approach, Speculator [35]
collects performance counter values to detect mispredicted
branches and speculative execution domain. Finally, Spec-
fuzz [44] uses a fuzzing strategy to analyze the control flow
paths which are most likely vulnerable against speculative
execution attacks.
3.2 Binary Analysis with Embedding
Binary analysis is one of the methods to analyze the security
of a program. The analysis can be performed dynamically [40]
by observing the binary code running in the system. Alterna-
tively, the binary can also be analyzed statically [55]. NLP
techniques have been applied to binary analysis in recent
years. Mostly, the studies leverage the aforementioned tech-
niques to embed Assembly instructions and registers into a
vector space. The most common usage of NLP in binary anal-
ysis is to find the similarities between files. Asm2Vec [10]
leverages a modified version of PV-DM model to solve the
obfuscation and optimization issues in a clone search. Zuo et
al. [73] and Redmond et al. [50] solve the binary similarity
problem by NLP techniques when the same file is compiled in
different architectures. SAFE [37] proposes a combination of
skip-gram and RNN self-attention model to learn the embed-
dings of the functions from binary files to find the similarities.
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3.3 GAN-based Text Generation
The first applications of GANs were mostly applied to com-
puter vision to create new images such as human faces [21,22],
photo blending [69], video generation [64], and so on. How-
ever, text generation is a more challenging task since it is
more difficult to evaluate the performance of the outputs.
An application [31] of GANs is in the dialogue generation,
where adversarial learning and reinforcement are applied to-
gether. SeqGAN [72] introduces gradient policy update with
Monte Carlo search. LeakGAN [17] implements a modified
policy gradient method to increase the usage of word-based
features in the adversarial learning. RelGAN [41] applies
Gumbel-Softmax relaxation for training GANs as an alterna-
tive method to gradient policy update. SentiGAN [67] pro-
poses multiple generators to focus on several sentiment labels
with one multi-class generator. However, to the best of our
knowledge, the literature lacks GANs which are applied to
the Assembly code generation. To fill this literature gap, we
propose SpectreGAN in Section 4.2.
4 Gadget Generation
We propose both mutational fuzzing and GAN-based gadget
generation techniques to create novel and diverse gadgets.
In the following sections, details of both techniques and the
diversity analysis of the gadgets are given:
4.1 Gadget Generation via Fuzzing
We begin with fuzzing techniques to extend the base gadgets
to create a large data set consists of a million Spectre gadgets
in four steps.
Algorithm 1: Gadget generation using mutational fuzzing
Input: An Assembly function A, a set of instructions Ib and
sets of registers Rb for different sizes of b
Output: A mutated Assembly function A′
1 G := Rb 7→ Ib
2 A′ = A
3 MaxOffset = length(A)
4 for 1:Diversity do
5 for Offset=1:MaxOffset do
6 for 1:Offset do
7 ib← random(I)
8 rb← random(Rb|G)
9 l← random(0 : length(A′))
10 Insert({ib|rb},A′, l)
11 end
12 Test boundary check(A′)
13 Test Spectre leakage(A′)
14 end
15 end
• Step 1: Initial Data Set There are 15 Spectre-V1 gadgets
written in C by Kocher [25] and 2 modified examples in-
troduced by Spectector [15]. For each example, a separate
attacker code is written to leak the whole secret data com-
pletely in a reasonable time.
• Step 2: Compiler variants and optimization levels Since
our target data set is in the Assembly code format, each
Spectre gadget written in C is compiled into x86 Assembly
code functions by using different compilers. We compiled
each example with gcc, clang and icc compilers using -o0
and -o2 optimization flags. Therefore, we obtain 6 differ-
ent Assembly functions from each C function with AT&T
syntax.
• Step 3: Mutational fuzzing based generation We gener-
ated new samples with an approach inspired from mutation-
based fuzzing technique [58] as introduced in Algorithm 1.
Our mutation operator is the insertion of random Assembly
instructions with random operands. For an Assembly func-
tion A with length L, we create a mutated assembly function
A′. We set a limit on the number of generated samples per
assembly function A for each Offset value, which is denoted
as Diversity. We choose a random instruction ib from the
instruction set I and depending on the instruction format
of ib, we choose random operands rb which are compati-
ble with the instruction in terms of bit size, b. After proper
instruction-operand selection, we choose a random posi-
tion l in A′ and insert {ib|rb} into that location. We repeat
the insertion process until we reach the Offset value. The
randomly inserted instruction and register list is given in
Appendix, Table 3.
• Step 4: Verification of generated gadgets Finally, A′ is
tested whether it still has the array boundary-check for a
given user input and still leaks the secret through speculative
execution or not. Since a random instruction is inserted in
a random location, it is likely to introduce an instruction
which alters the flags whose value is checked by the original
conditional jump. Thus, the secret may be leaked as the flags
are broken. To overcome broken-flag issue, we perform
boundary-check test by giving out-of-bound values to A′. If
the gadget still leaks the secret, we exclude the candidate
gadget from our data set since the gadget is no longer a
Spectre-V1 gadget.
At the end of fuzzing-based generation, we obtained a data
set of almost 1.1 million Spectre gadgets1. The overall suc-
cess rate of fuzzing technique is around 5% out of compiled
gadgets. The generated gadgets are used to train SpectreGAN
in the next section.
1The entire data set and fuzzing/SpectreGAN generation codes will be
available at https://github.com/vernamlab/FastSpec
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4.2 SpectreGAN: Assembly Code Generation
with GANs
We introduce SpectreGAN which learns the fuzzing generated
gadgets in an unsupervised way and generates new Spectre-
V1 variants from existing examples in assembly language.
The purpose of SpectreGAN is to develop an intelligent way
of creating assembly functions instead of randomly inserting
instructions and operands. Hence, the low gadget generation
rate of fuzzing technique can be improved further with GANs.
We build SpectreGAN based on the MaskGAN model with
1.1 million examples generated in Section 4. Since MaskGAN
is originally designed for text generation, we modify the
MaskGAN architecture to train SpectreGAN on Assembly
language. Finally, we evaluate the performance of Spectre-
GAN and discuss challenges in assembly code generation.
4.2.1 SpectreGAN Architecture
As all the GAN frameworks, SpectreGAN has a generator
model which learns and generates x86 Assembly functions,
and a discriminator model which gives feedback to the gen-
erator model by classifying the generated samples as real or
fake as depicted in Figure 1.
Generator The generator model consists of encoder-
decoder architecture (seq2seq) [57] which is composed of two-
layer stacked LSTM units. Firstly, the input assembly func-
tions are converted to a sequence of tokens T ′ = {x′1, ...,x′N}
where each token represents an instruction, register, parenthe-
sis, comma, intermediate value or label. SpectreGAN is condi-
tionally trained with each sequence of tokens where a masking
vector m = (m1, ...,mN) with elements mt ∈ {0,1} is gener-
ated. The masking rate of m is determined as rm =
1
N
∑Nt=1 mt .
m(T ′) is the modified sequence where x′t is replaced with
<MASK> token for the corresponding positions of mt = 1.
Both T ′ and m(T ′) are converted into the lists of vectors
T = {x1, ...,xN} and m(T ) by a lookup in a randomly initial-
ized embedding matrix of size V ×H, where V and H are
the vocabulary size and embedding vector dimension, respec-
tively. In order to learn the masked tokens, T and m(T ) are
fed into the encoder LSTM units of the generator model. Each
encoder unit outputs a hidden state hs which is also given as
an input to the next encoder unit. The last encoder unit (e6G
in Figure 1) produces the final hidden state which encapsu-
lates the information learned from all assembly tokens.
The decoder state is initialized with the final hidden state
of the encoder and the decoder LSTM units are fed with m(T )
at each iteration. To calculate the hidden state h˜t of each de-
coder unit, the attention mechanism output and the current
state of the decoder ht are combined. The attention mecha-
nism reduces the information bottleneck between encoder and
decoder and eases the training [2] on long token sequences in
assembly function data set. The attention mechanism is im-
plemented exactly same for both generator and discriminator
model which is illustrated in the discriminator part in Figure 1.
The alignment score vector at is calculated as:
at(s) =
eh
>
t hs
∑Ns′=1 e
h>t hs′
, (2)
where at describes the weights of hs, for a token x′t at time
step t, where h>t hs is the score value between the token x′t and
T ′. This forces decoder to consider the relation between each
instruction, register, label and other tokens before generating a
new token. The context vector ct is calculated as the weighted
sum of hs as follows:
ct =
N
∑
s′=1
at(s)hs′ . (3)
For a context vector, ct , the final attention-based hidden
state, h˜t , is obtained by a fully connected layer with hyperbolic
tangent activation function,
h˜t = tanh(Wc[ct ;ht ]), (4)
where [ct ;ht ] is the concatenation of ct and ht with the train-
able weights Wc. The output list of tokens T˜ = (x˜1, ..., x˜N)
is then generated by filling the masked positions for m(T ′)
where mt = 1. The probability distribution p(yt |y1:t−1,xt) is
calculated as,
p(yt |y1:t−1,xt) = e
Wsh˜t
∑eWsh˜t
, (5)
where yt is the output token and attention-based hidden state
h˜t is fed into the softmax layer which is represented by the
green boxes in Figure 1. It is important to note that the softmax
layer is modified to introduce a randomness at the output of
the decoder by a sampling operation. The predicted token is
selected based on the probability distribution of vocabulary,
i.e. if a token has a probability of 0.3, it will be selected
with a 30% chance. This prevents the selection of the token
with the highest probability every time. Hence, at each run
the predicted token would be different which increases the
diversity in the generated gadgets.
Discriminator The discriminator model has a very similar
architecture with the generator model. The encoder and de-
coder units in the discriminator model are again two-layer
stacked LSTM units. The embedding vectors m(T ) of tokens
m(T ′), where we replace x′t with <MASK> when mt = 1, are
fed into the encoder. The hidden vector encodings hs and the
final state of the encoder are given to the decoder.
The LSTM units in the decoder are initialized with the final
hidden state of the encoder and hs is given to the attention
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Figure 1: SpectreGAN architecture. Blue and red boxes represent the encoder and decoder LSTM units respectively. Green boxes
represent the softmax layers. The listed assembly function (AT&T format) on the left is fed to the models after the tokenization
process. The critic model and the decoder part of the discriminator get the same sequence of instructions in the adversarial
training.
layer. The list of tokens T˜ which represents the generated as-
sembly function by the generator model is fed into the decoder
LSTM unit with teacher forcing. The previous calculations
for at(s), ct and h˜t stated in Equation 2, 3, and 4 are valid for
the attention layer in the discriminator model as well. The
attention-based state value h˜t is fed through the softmax layer
which outputs only one value at each time step t,
pD(x˜t = xrealt |T˜ ) =
eWsh˜t
∑eWsh˜t
, (6)
which is the probability of being a real target token xrealt .
SpectreGAN has one more model apart from the generator
and the discriminator models, which is called critic model
and it has only one two-layer stacked LSTM unit. The critic
model is initialized with zero states and gets the same input T˜
with the decoder. The output of LSTM unit at each time step
t is given to the softmax layer and we obtain
pC(x˜t = xrealt |T˜ ) =
eWbht
∑eWbht
, (7)
which is an estimated version of pD. The purpose of introduc-
ing a critic model for probability estimation will be explained
in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.2 Training
The training procedure consists of two main phases namely,
pre-training and adversarial training.
Pre-training phase The generator model is first trained
with maximum likelihood estimation. The real token sequence
T ′ and masked version m(T ′) are fed into the encoder of the
generator model. In the pre-training, only the real token se-
quence T ′ is fed into the decoder using teacher forcing. The
training maximizes the log-probability of generated tokens,
x˜t given the real tokens, x′t , where mt = 1. Therefore, the pre-
training objective is
1
N
N
∑
t=1
log p(m(x˜t)|m(x′t)), (8)
where p(m(x˜t)|m(x′t)) is calculated only for the masked po-
sitions. The masked pre-training objective ensures that the
model is trained for a Cloze task [59].
Adversarial training phase The second phase is the adver-
sarial training where the generator and the discriminator are
trained with the GAN framework. Since the generator model
has a sampling operation from the probability distribution
stated in Equation 5, the overall GAN framework is not differ-
entiable. We utilize the policy gradients to train the generator
model as described in the previous works [12, 72].
The reward rt for a generated token x˜t is calculated as the
logarithm of pD(x˜t = xrealt |T˜ ). The aim of the generator model
is to maximize the total discounted rewards Rt =m(∑Ns=t γsrs)
for the fake samples, where γ is the discount factor. There-
fore, for each token, the generator is updated with the gradi-
ent in Equation 9 using the REINFORCE algorithm, where
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bt = log pC(x˜t = xrealt |T˜ ) is the baseline rewards by the critic
model. Subtracting bt from Rt helps reducing the variance of
the gradient [12].
∇θEG[Rt ] = (Rt −bt)∇θ logGθ(x˜t) (9)
To train the discriminator model, both real sequence T and
fake sequence T˜ are fed into the discriminator. Then, the
model parameters are updated such that log pD(x˜t = xrealt |T˜ )
is minimized and log pD(xt = xrealt |T ) is maximized using
maximum log-likelihood estimation.
4.2.3 Tokenization and Training Parameters
Firstly, we pre-process the fuzzing generated data set in or-
der to convert the assembly functions into sequences of to-
kens, T ′ = (x′1, ...,x
′
N). We keep commas, parenthesis, imme-
diate values, labels, instruction and register names as sep-
arate tokens. To decrease the complexity, we reduce the
vocabulary size of the tokens and simplify the labels in
each function so that the total number of different labels
is minimum. The tokenization process converts the instruc-
tion "movq (%rax), %rdx" into the list ["movq", "(",
"%rax", ")", ",", "%rdx"] where each element of the
list is a token x′t . Hence, each token list T ′ = {x′1, ...,x′N} rep-
resents an assembly function in the data set.
Masking vector has two different roles in the training.
While a random masking vector m = (m1, ...,mN) is initial-
ized for the pre-training, we generate m as a contiguous block
with a random starting position in the adversarial training. In
both training phases, the mask for the first token is always
selected as m1 = 0, meaning that the first token given to the
model is always real. The masking rate, rm determines the
ratio of masked tokens in an assembly function whose effect
on code generation is analyzed further in Section 4.2.4.
SpectreGAN is configured with the embedding vector size
of d = 64, generator learning rate of ηG = 5×10−4, discrim-
inator learning rate of ηD = 5×10−3, critic learning rate of
ηC = 5× 10−7 and discount rate of γ = 0.89 based on the
MaskGAN implementation 2. We select the sequences with a
maximum length of 250 tokens, which then build the vocabu-
lary with a size of V = 419. We separate 10% of the data set
for model validation. SpectreGAN is trained with a batch size
of 100 on NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti until the validation
perplexity converges in Figure 2. The pre-training lasts about
50 hours while the adversarial training phase takes around 30
hours.
4.2.4 Evaluation
SpectreGAN is based on learning masked tokens with the
surrounding tokens. The masking rate is not a fixed value
which is determined based on the context. Since Spectre-
GAN is the first study to train on Assembly functions, the
2https://github.com/tensorflow/models/tree/master/research/maskgan
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Figure 2: (Above) The validation perplexity decreases at each
training step and converges for all rm. (Below) Spectre gadget
success rates are evaluated when different masking rates are
used to train SpectreGAN. Spectre gadget success rate shows
the percentage of gadgets out of compiled functions.
choice of masking rate is of utmost importance to generate
high quality gadgets. Typically, NLP-based generation tech-
niques are evaluated with their associated perplexity score
which is the indicator of how well a token is predicted by the
model. Hence, we evaluate the performance of SpectreGAN
with various masking sizes and their perplexity scores. In Fig-
ure 2, the perplexity converges with the increasing number of
training steps, which means the tokens are predicted with a
higher accuracy towards the end of the training. SpectreGAN
achieves lower perplexity with higher masking rates which
indicates that higher masking rates are more preferable for
SpectreGAN.
Even though the higher masking rates yield lower perplex-
ity and assembly functions of high quality in terms of token
probabilities, our purpose is to create functions which behave
as Spectre gadgets. Therefore, as a second test, we gener-
ated 100,000 gadgets for 5 different masking rates. Next, we
compiled our gadgets with gcc compiler, and then tested them
with all the attacker codes to verify their secret leakage. When
SpectreGAN is trained with a masking rate of 0.3, the success
rate of gadgets increases up to 72%. Interestingly, the success
rate drops for other masking rates, which also demonstrates
the importance of masking rate choice. In total, 70,000 gad-
gets are generated with a masking rate of 0.3 to evaluate the
performance of SpectreGAN in terms of the gadget diversity
in Section 4.3.
To illustrate an example of the generated samples, we fed
the gadget in Listing 2 to SpectreGAN and generated a new
gadget in Listing 3. We demonstrate that SpectreGAN is capa-
ble of generating realistic assembly code snippets by inserting,
removing, or replacing the instructions, registers, and labels.
In the Listing 3, the lines that start with the instructions writ-
ten with red color are generated by SpectreGAN and they
correspond to the masked portion of Spectre-V1 gadget given
in Listing 2.
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1 victim_function:
2 .cfi_startproc
3 movl size(%rip ) ,%eax
4 cmpq %rdi,%rax
5 jbe .L0
6 leaq array1(%rip ) ,%rax
7 movzbl (%rdi,%rax),%eax
8 ror $1,%rsi
9 shlq $9,%rax
10 leaq array2(%rip ) ,%rcx
11 movss %xmm8,%xmm4
12 movb (%rax,%rcx),%al
13 andb %al,temp(%rip)
14 movd %xmm1,%r14d
15 test %r15,%rcx
16 sbbl %r13d,%r9d
17 .L0:
18 retq
19 cmovll %r8d,%r10d
20 .cfi_endproc
Listing 2: Input Spectre-
V1 gadget
1 victim_function:
2 .cfi_startproc
3 movl size(%rip ) ,%eax
4 cmpq %rdi,%rax
5 jbe .L0
6 leaq array1(%rip ) ,%rax
7 movzbl (%rdi,%rax),%eax
8 ror $1,%rsi
9 shlq $9,%rax
10 movb array2(%rdi ) ,%al
11 andb %al,temp(%rip)
12 .L1:
13 andb %r13b,%al
14 movb array2(%rax) ,%al
15 andb %al,temp(%rip)
16 sbbl %r13d,%r9d
17 .L0:
18 retq
19 cmovll %r8d,%r10d
20 .cfi_endproc
Listing 3: Generated
gadget by SpectreGAN
4.3 Diversity Analysis of Generated Gadgets
Mutational fuzzing and SpectreGAN generated approximately
1.2 million gadgets in total. Since the gadgets are derived from
existing examples, it is crucial to analyze their diversity. For
this purpose, we randomly select 10,000 samples from fuzzing
and SpectreGAN generated gadgets, and then we evaluate the
gadget quality with syntactic and microarchitectural analysis
as well as their detection rates in oo7 [66] and Spectector [15]
tools.
4.3.1 Syntactic Analysis
The quality of generated texts is mostly evaluated by analyz-
ing the number of unique n-grams. For instance, perplexity
and BLEU concepts are calculated based on the probabilis-
tic occurrences of n-grams in a sequence. However, these
scores are obtained during the training phase, which makes it
impossible to evaluate fuzzing generated gadgets. Hence, to
determine the diversity of the generated gadgets, we analyze
the unique n-grams introduced by fuzzing and SpectreGAN
methods.
The number of unique n-grams in newly generated gad-
gets are compared with the 15 base examples in Table 1. The
unique n-grams are calculated as follows: First, unique n-
grams produced by fuzzing are identified and stored in a list.
Then, the unique n-grams in SpectreGAN gadgets which are
not present in fuzzing generated gadgets are noted. There-
fore, the unique n-grams generated by SpectreGAN in Table 1
represent the number of n-grams introduced by SpectreGAN
excluding fuzzing generated n-grams. In total, the number of
unique bigrams (2-grams) is increased from 2,069 to 22,910
to more than a 10-fold increase. While new instructions added
by fuzzing improve the diversity in the gadgets, SpectreGAN
contributes to the gadget diversity by introducing perturba-
tions. Since the number of instructions increase drastically
compared to base gadgets, the unique 5-grams are increased
to almost 2 million from 4747 5-grams.
Table 1: Table shows the number of unique n-grams for base
gadgets and generated gadgets by fuzzing and SpectreGAN.
In the last column the total number of unique n-grams and the
factor of increase are given.
Base Fuzzing SpectreGAN Total
2-grams 2069 15,448 7,462 22,910 (×11)
3-grams 3349 181,606 91,851 273,457 (×82)
4-grams 4161 639,608 460,317 1,099,925 (×264)
5-grams 4747 998,279 921,519 1,919,798 (×404)
4.3.2 Microarchitectural Analysis
The purpose of gadget generation is to introduce various
instructions and operands to create diverse gadgets, which
also affect the microarchitectural characteristics of the gad-
gets. However, it is challenging to examine the effects of
instructions in the transient domain since they are not visi-
ble in the architectural state. After we carefully analyzed the
performance counters for the Haswell architecture, we de-
termined that two counters namely, UOPS_ISSUED : ANY
and UOPS_RET IRED : ANY give an idea to what extent
the speculative window is altered. UOPS_ISSUED : ANY
counter is incremented every time a µop is issued which
counts both speculative and non-speculative µops. On the
other hand, UOPS_RET IRED : ANY counter only counts the
executed and committed µops which automatically excludes
speculatively executed µops.
The distribution of generated gadgets and base gadgets are
given in Figure 3. The gadget quality improves when the
difference between issued and retired µops increases since
high difference means the gadgets contain more instructions
in the speculative domain. Hence, if a gadget is close to the
x-axis and far from the y-axis, the gadget diversity increases
in parallel. Especially, gadgets with more instructions in the
speculative domain tend to bypass detectors with a higher
chance.
It is more likely to obtain more diverse gadgets with fuzzing
during which instructions are randomly added. On the other
hand, SpectreGAN learns the essential structure of the fuzzing
generated gadgets, which yields almost the same number of
samples close to x-axis in Figure 3. Moreover, the advantage
of SpectreGAN is to automate the creation of gadgets with
high accuracy (%72) compared to fuzzing (%5).
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Figure 3: The distribution of base (red), fuzzing generated (blue) and SpectreGAN generated (green) gadgets is given for 2 µops
counters. Both SpectreGAN and fuzzing techniques generate diverse set of gadgets for the Haswell architecture.
4.3.3 Detection Analysis
Even though the microarchitectural and syntactic analyses
show that fuzzing and SpectreGAN can produce diverse set
of gadgets, we aim to enable comprehensive evaluation of
detection tools as well as determine the most interesting gad-
gets in our data set. For this reason, the generated gadgets are
fed into the Spectector [15] and oo7 [66] tools to analyze the
novelty of the gadgets.
oo7 The oo7 tool leverages taint analysis to detect Spectre-
V1 gadgets. It is based on the Binary Analysis Platform
(BAP) [8] which forwards taint propagation along all pos-
sible paths after a conditional branch is encountered. oo7 3
is built on a set of hand-written rules which cover the ex-
isting examples by Kocher [25]. Although our data set size
is 1.2 million, we have selected 100,000 samples from each
gadget example uniformly random due to the immense time
consumption of oo7 (150 hours for 100K gadgets) which
achieves 94% detection rate.
Interestingly, specific gadget types from both fuzzing and
SpectreGAN are not caught by oo7. When a gadget contains
cmov or xchg or set instruction and its variants, it is not iden-
tified as a Spectre gadget. Hence, we introduce these new
gadgets as new Spectre-V1 gadgets that are listed in Listing 4
and Listing 5. The corresponding assembly files generated
from fuzzing and SpectreGAN are given in Appendix A.
3https://gitlab.com/igoto/spectre-detector
1 void victim_function(size_t x){
2 if(global_condition)
3 x = 0;
4 if(x < size)
5 temp &= array2[array1[x] * 512];
6 }
Listing 4: CMOV gadget: An example Spectre gadget in C
format. When it is compiled with gcc-7.5 -o2 optimization
level, CMOVcc gadget bypasses oo7 tool. The generated
assembly version is given in Appendix A.
1 size_t prev = 0xff;
2 void victim_function(size_t x) {
3 if (prev < size)
4 temp &= array2[array1[prev] * 512];
5 prev = x;
6 }
Listing 5: XCHG gadget: When a past value controlled by
the attacker is used in the Spectre gadget, oo7 cannot
detect the XCHG gadget
Spectector Spectector [15] makes use of symbolic execu-
tion technique to detect the potential Spectre-V1 gadgets. For
each Assembly file, Spectector is adjusted to track 25 sym-
bolic paths of at most 5000 instructions each, with a global
timeout of 30 minutes. The remaining parameters are kept as
default.
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When we analyze the generated gadgets with Spectector
23.75% of the gadgets are not detected by Spectector. We
observed that 96% of the undetected gadgets contain unsup-
ported instruction/register which is the indicator of an im-
plementation issue in Spectector. On the other hand, the re-
maining 1% of the gadgets is more crucial to determine the
novelty of the gadgets. After we examined the undetected gad-
gets, we observed that if the gadgets include either sfence/m-
fence/lfence or 8-bit registers (%al, %bl, %cl, %dl), they are
likely to bypass Spectector. We introduce the corresponding
novel gadgets and their code snippets in Appendix A.
5 FastSpec: Fast Gadget Detection Using
BERT
In an assembly function representation model, the main chal-
lenge is to obtain the representation vectors, namely embed-
ding vectors, for each token in a function. Since the skip-
gram and RNN-based training models are surpassed by the
attention-only models in sentence classification tasks, we
introduce FastSpec which applies a lightweight version of
BERT.
5.1 Training Procedures
We adopt the same training procedures with BERT on assem-
bly functions, which are called pre-training and fine-tuning.
5.1.1 Pre-training
The first procedure is pre-training which includes two unsu-
pervised tasks. The first task follows a similar approach to
MaskGAN by masking a portion of tokens in an assembly
function. Differently, the mask positions are selected from
15% of the training sequence and the selected positions are
masked and replaced with <MASK> token with 0.80 probability,
replaced with a random token with 0.10 probability or kept
as the same token with 0.10 probability. While the masked to-
kens are predicted based on the context of other tokens in the
sequence, the context vectors are obtained by the multi-head
self-attention mechanism.
The second task is the next sentence prediction where the
previous sentence is given as an input. Since our assembly
code data has no paragraph structure where the separate long
sequences follow each other, each assembly function is split
into pieces with a maximum token size of 50. For the next
sentence prediction task, we add <CLS> to each piece. For
each piece of function, the following piece is given with the
label IsNext, and a random piece of function is given with
label NotNext. FastSpec is trained with the self-supervised
approach.
At the end of the pre-training procedure, each token is rep-
resented by an embedding vector with a size of H. Since it
is not possible to visualize the high dimensional embedding
vectors, we leverage the t-SNE algorithm [33] which maps
the embedding vectors to a three-dimensional space as shown
in Figure 4. We illustrate that the embedding vectors for simi-
lar tokens are close to each other in three dimensional space
as this outcome shows that the embedding vectors are learned
efficiently. In Figure 4, the registers with different sizes, float-
ing point instructions, control flow instructions, shift/rotate
instructions, set instructions, and MMX instructions/registers
are accumulated in separate clusters. The separation among
different type of tokens enables to achieve a higher success
rate in Spectre gadget detection phase.
5.1.2 Fine-tuning
The second procedure is called fine-tuning which corresponds
to a supervised sequence classification in FastSpec. This
phase enables FastSpec to learn the conceptual differences be-
tween Spectre gadgets and general purpose functions through
labeled pieces. The pieces that are created for the pre-training
phase are merged into a single sequence with a maximum
size of 250 tokens. The disassembled object files, which have
more than 250 tokens, split into separate sequences. Each
sequence is represented by a single <CLS> token at the be-
ginning. The benign disassembled files are labeled with 0
and the gadget samples are labeled with 1 for the supervised
classification. Then, the embedding vectors of the correspond-
ing <CLS> token and position embedding vectors for the first
position are summed up. Finally, the resulting vector is fed
into the softmax layer which is fine-tuned with supervised
training. The output probabilities of the softmax layer are the
predictions on the assembly code sequence.
5.2 Training Details and Evaluation
We combine the assembly data set that was generated in Sec-
tion 4 and the disassembled Linux libraries to train FastSpec.
Although it is possible that Linux libraries contain Spectre-V1
gadgets, we assume that the total number of hidden Spectre
gadgets are negligible comparing the total size of the data
set. Therefore, the model treat those gadgets as noise, which
have no effect on the performance of FastSpec. In total, a data
set of 107 million lines of assembly code is collected which
consists of 370 million tokens after the pre-processing. We
separate 80% of the data set for training and validation, and
the remaining 20% is used for FastSpec evaluation. While the
same pre-processing phase in Section 4.2.3 is implemented,
we further merge similar types of tokens to decrease the total
vocabulary size. We replace all labels, immediate values and
out-of-vocabulary tokens with <label>, <imm> and <UNK>,
respectively. After the pre-processing, the vocabulary size is
reduced to 960.
We set the number of Transformer blocks as L = 3, the hid-
den size as H = 64, and the number of self-attention heads as
A= 2. We train FastSpec on NVIDIA Titan XP GPU. The pre-
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Figure 4: 3-D visualization for the distribution of instructions and registers after t-SNE is applied to embedding vectors. Similar
instructions and registers have the same colors. The unrelated instructions are separated from each other in the three-dimensional
space after the pre-training.
training phase takes approximately 6 hours with a sequence
length of 50. We further train the positional embeddings for
1 hour with a sequence length of 250. The fine-tuning takes
only 20 minutes on the pre-trained model to achieve classi-
fying all types of samples in the test data set correctly. Note
that the training time is less than previous NLP techniques in
the literature since BERT [9] leverages GPU parallelization,
significantly. The analysis duration is measured on Intel Xeon
CPU E5-2637 v2 @3.50GHz.
In the evaluation of FastSpec, we obtained 1.3 million true
positives and 110 false positives (99.9% precision rate) in
the test data set which demonstrates the high performance of
FastSpec. We assume that the false positives are Spectre-like
gadgets in Linux libraries, which needs to be explored deeply
in the future work. Moreover, we only have 55 false negatives
(99.9% recall rate) which yields 0.99 F-1 score on the test
data set.
In the next section, we show that FastSpec achieves high
performance and extremely fast gadget detection without
needing any GPU acceleration since FastSpec is built on a
lightweight BERT implementation.
5.3 Case Study: Phoronix Test Suite Analysis
The performance comparison between FastSpec and other
detection tools is evaluated on the Phoronix Test Suite v5.2.1.
The selected benign files have source codes since it is required
to obtain the assembly files for Spectector tool. The assembly
files are generated by compiling the source C codes with the
gcc compiler. On the other hand, the binary files are generated
at the time of the test installation, therefore, there is no further
processing required before testing the binary files in oo7. For
FastSpec, the disassembled binary files are given as an input.
Note that since the larger benchmarks take more time to be
analyzed by oo7, we preferred small size files to make the
comparison with Spectector and FastSpec easier.
Timing The overall timing results for various benchmarks
are given in Table 2. The analysis time of oo7 and Spectector
increases drastically with the number of conditional branches
since the tools analyze both paths after a conditional branch
is encountered. On the other hand, FastSpec analysis time
increases linearly with the binary size. We observed that the
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Figure 5: The processing time of FastSpec is independent of
the number of branches whereas for Spectector and oo7 the
analysis time increases drastically.
pre-processing phase takes the major portion in the analysis
time of FastSpec while the inference time is in the order of
microseconds.
The effect of the increasing number of branches on time
consumption is clear in Crafty and Clomp benchmarks in Ta-
ble 2. Even though Crafty benchmark has only 10,796
branches, oo7 and Spectector analyze the file in more than 10
days (the analysis process is terminated after 10 days) and 2
days, respectively. In Figure 5, we show that both tools are
not sufficiently scalable to be used in real-world applications,
especially when the files contain thousands of conditional
branches. Especially oo7 shows an exponential behavior be-
cause of the forced execution approach which executes every
possible path of the conditional branches. In contrast, Fast-
Spec analyzed the same Crafty benchmark under 6 minutes
which is a significant improvement over rule-based tools.
Note that Byte benchmark has a higher number of branches
than most of the remaining benchmarks. However, it consists
of multiple files that need to be tested separately which takes
less time to analyze in total. Consequently, FastSpec is faster
than oo7 and Spectector 455 times and 75 times on average,
respectively.
Number of Gadgets The number of gadgets found by the
tools varies significantly. While oo7 and FastSpec report each
Spectre gadget in a binary file, Spectector outputs whether a
function contains a Spectre gadget or not. Hence, if a control
or data leakage is found in a function, it is reported as a
vulnerable function. Thus, we give the number of vulnerable
functions instead of the number of gadgets in Table 2 for
Spectector. FastSpec is more likely to detect gadgets that are
not discovered by oo7 and Spectector such as in Xsbench
and Stream benchmarks. On the other hand, FastSpec detects
the most number of gadgets compared to other tools when
a confidence rate threshold of 0.6 is applied for the gadget
classification.If two gadgets are closer to each other than the
window size, the gadgets are counted as one gadget. Moreover,
the confidence rate threshold of FastSpec can be increased to
detect the Spectre gadgets with higher probabilities. FastSpec
is flexible since a confidence rate is given for each Spectre
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Figure 6: OpenSSL crypto library (libcrypto−lib−ex_data)
analysis by FastSpec. The blue line represents the confidence
ratio for a window of 50 tokens. When the confidence exceeds
0.6, the window is classified as Spectre gadget as the red line
shows.
gadget, which can be tuned based on the developers’ need.
5.4 Case Study: OpenSSL Analysis
We use FastSpec to analyze OpenSSL crypto libraries for any
Spectre-V1 gadgets. We focus on OpenSSL 1.1.1g, as it is a
popular in commercial software. We selected general purpose
libraries which are used in many crypto functions whose list
is given in Table 4 in the Appendix. In total, 109 object files
are extracted from libraries to analyze with FastSpec.
First, we apply the same pre-processing procedures as ex-
plained in Section 5.2 to obtain the tokens. The total number
of tokens is 203,055 while the analysis time is around 17 min-
utes. An resule of a sample gadget detection scan on a crypto
library is given in Figure 6 where the potential gadgets are
identified with FastSpec. The confidence rate increases with
the potential gadgets which mostly consist of conditional jump
instructions. The confidence threshold is chosen as 0.6 as in
the Phoronix benchmark case. In total, we discovered 379 po-
tential Spectre gadgets which may be subject to exploitation.
In contrast, these gadgets are not always exploitable since
the third-party user input is not feasible. Therefore, we claim
that these gadgets can be further analyzed with rule-based
detection techniques for leakage detection.
6 Discussion and Limitations
Scalability: Although we limit the scope of this paper to
generating and detecting the Spectre-V1 gadgets on x86
assembly code, the use of SpectreGAN and FastSpec can
always be extended to other architectures and applications
with only mild effort. Furthermore, specially designed archi-
tectures are not needed when pre-trained embedding repre-
sentations are used [9]. Therefore, the pre-trained FastSpec
model can be used for any other vulnerability detection, cross-
architecture code migration, binary clone detection, and many
other assembly-level tasks.
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Table 2: Comparison of oo7 [66], Spectector [15] and FastSpec on the Phoronix Test Suite. The last column shows that FastSpec
is on average 455 times faster than oo7 and 75 times faster than Spectector.
oo7 Spectector FastSpec
Program Binary Size (KB) #Cond. Branches #Functions #Detected Time (sec) #Detected Time (sec) #Detected Time (sec)
Byte 183.5 363 30 116 400 3 115 70 14
Cachebench 27.7 149 18 0 556 5 360 24 5
Clomp 79.4 1464 63 0 17.5 hours 18 10057 30 35
Crafty 594.8 10796 189 342 >10 days 73 18 hours 798 315
C-ray 27.2 139 9 23 395 5 153 9 8
E-bizzy 18.5 104 11 0 467 5 206 8 3
Mbw 13.2 70 4 0 145 2 34 9 2
M-queens 13.4 51 2 8 136 2 24 9 2
Postmark 38.0 309 38 37 3409 14 1202 30 10
Stream 22.0 113 2 0 231 0 63 17 4
Tio-test 36.1 169 16 0 813 4 201 9 9
Tscp 40.8 651 7 0 6667 2 972 42 12
T-test 13.7 47 5 0 99 3 36 11 3
Xsbench 27.9 153 81 8 1985 0 249 19 7
Challenges in Assembly Code Generation The chal-
lenges faced in the regular text generation with GANs [12,72]
also exist in assembly code generation. One of the challenges
is mode collapse in the generator models. Although training
the model and generating the gadgets with masking help re-
ducing mode collapse, we observed that our generator model
still generates some tokens or patterns of tokens repetitively,
which reduces the quality of the generated samples, compila-
tion, and real gadget generation rates.
In regular text generation, even if the position of a token
changes in a sequence, the meaning of the sequence may
change while it would be still somewhat acceptable. However,
if the position of a token in an assembly function changes, it
may result in a compilation error because of the incorrect syn-
tax. Even if the generated assembly function has the correct
assembly syntax, the function behavior may be completely
different from the expected one due to the positions of a few
instructions and registers.
Window Size: Since Transformer architecture has no uti-
lization of recurrent modeling as RNNs do, the maximum
sequence length is needed to be set before the training pro-
cedures. Therefore, the sliding window size can be set to at
most the maximum sequence length. On the other hand, our
experiments show that lower window sizes compared to max-
imum sequence length detect more code snippets that have
a higher possibility of being a Spectre gadget and provide
fine-grain information on the sequence. The further analysis
on window size selection is given in Appendix B.
7 Conclusion
This work for the first time proposed NLP inspired approaches
for Spectre gadget generation and detection. First, we ex-
tended our gadget corpus to 1.1 million samples with a mu-
tational fuzzing technique. We introduced SpectreGAN tool
that achieves a high success rate in creating new Spectre gad-
gets by automatically learning the structure of gadgets in
assembly language. SpectreGAN overcomes the difficulties
of training a large model for assembly language, which is a
completely different domain compared to natural language.
We demonstrate that 72% of the compiled code snippets be-
have as a Spectre gadget which is a huge improvement over
fuzzing based generation. Furthermore, we show that our gen-
erated gadgets span the speculative domain by introducing
new instructions and their perturbations which yield diverse
and novel gadgets. The most interesting gadgets are also in-
troduced as new examples of Spectre-V1 gadgets. Finally, we
propose FastSpec which is based on BERT style neural em-
bedding to detect the hidden Spectre gadgets. We demonstrate
that for large binary files, FastSpec is 2 to 3 orders of magni-
tude faster than oo7 and Spectector while it still detects more
gadgets. We also demonstrate the scalability of FastSpec on
OpenSSL libraries to detect potential gadgets.
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A Gadget Examples from oo7 and Spectector
Tests
1 victim_function :
2 xchg %rdi , %r13
3 cmpl %esp , %esp
4 movl a r r a y 1 _ s i z e ( % r i p ) , %eax
5 s h r $1 , %r11
6 cmpq %rdi , %rax
7 j b e .LBB1_1
8 addq %r13 , %r11
9 l e a q a r r a y 1 ( % r i p ) , %rax
10 movzbl (%rdi , %rax ) , %edi
11 jmp l e a k B y t e N o i n l i n e F u n c t i o n
12 .LBB1_1 :
13 r e t q
14 l e a k B y t e N o i n l i n e F u n c t i o n :
15 movl %edi , %eax
16 s h l q $9 , %rax
17 l e a q a r r a y 2 ( % r i p ) , %rcx
18 movb (%rax , %rcx ) , %al
19 andb %al , temp(%rip )
20 r e t q
Listing 6: While generating gadgets with mutational
fuzzing technique, this code is generated by our algorithm
from Kocher’s example 3 (using clang-6.0 with 02
optimization). The xchg %rdi, %r13 instruction stores
the content of %rdi register to %r13 register. In the next
iterations of leaking the secret, the stored value is being
accessed and as a result the oo7 is fooled
1 victim_function :
2 movl s i z e ( % r i p ) , %eax
3 cmpq %rax , %rdi
4 j a e .B1.2
5 movzbl a r r a y 1 ( % r d i ) , %eax
6 s h l q $9 , %rax
7 xorb %al , %al
8 movb a r r a y 2 ( % r a x ) , %dl
9 andb %dl , temp(%rip )
10 .B1.2 :
11 r e t
Listing 7: xorb %al, %al is added to 1st example in
Kocher examples [25]. Spectector is no longer able to
detect the leakage due to the zeroing %al register.
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1 victim_function :
2 .LFB23 :
3 movl g l o b a l _ c o n d i t i o n ( % r i p ) , %eax
4 t e s t l %eax , %eax
5 movl $0 , %eax
6 cmovne %rax , %rdi
7 movslq a r r a y 1 _ s i z e ( % r i p ) , %rax
8 cmpq %rdi , %rax
9 j b e .L1
10 l e a q a r r a y 1 ( % r i p ) , %rax
11 l e a q a r r a y 2 ( % r i p ) , %rdx
12 movzbl (%rax , %rdi ) , %eax
13 s a l l $12 , %eax
14 c l t q
15 movzbl (%rdx , %rax ) , %eax
16 andb %al , temp(%rip )
17 .L1 :
18 r e p r e t
Listing 8: When the C code in Listing 4 compiled with
certain optimizations (gcc 7-4 with O2 enabled) the
Assembly code contains CMOV instruction which fools
oo7
1 victim_function :
2 seta %si l
3 cmpl $0 , ( % r s i )
4 j e .LBB0_2
5 a d d l %r15d , %r12d
6 s a r q $1 , %r11
7 addb %si l , %r15b
8 movzbl a r r a y 1 ( % r d i ) , %eax
9 j a .L1324337
10 t e s t w %r10w , %ax
11 s h l q $12 , %rax
12 nop
13 movb a r r a y 2 ( % r a x ) , %al
14 .L1324337 :
15 andb %al , temp(%rip )
16 .LBB0_2 :
17 r e t q
Listing 9: While generating gadgets with mutational
fuzzing technique, this code is generated by our algorithm
from Kocher’s example 9 (using clang-6.0 with 02
optimization). The seta %sil instruction sets the lowest
8-bit of %rsi register based on a condition which results
in fooling the oo7
B Fine-tuning Sliding Window
We analyze the performance of FastSpec with synthetic data
to obtain the optimal value for the window size. We insert
a known Spectre code with a size of 89 tokens to a random
benchmark code given in Listing 1. In Figure 7, FastSpec
detects a simple Spectre gadget with a 0.9 confidence rate for
a contiguous interval of 108 tokens. This result shows that
FastSpec can detect a hidden gadget with a sliding window
size of 50, even though the gadget length is larger than the
window size. The window size is set to 50 in the remaining
experiments.
When FastSpec is implemented with a window size of 50 to
analyze Cachebench benchmark, 24 potential Spectre gadgets
are discovered in Figure 7. The threshold of 0.6 is chosen as
the threshold to distinguish the benign and Spectre gadgets.
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Figure 7: (Above) The confidence rates of sliding windows
with token size 50 is shown for a benign assembly function.
(Below) The inserted Spectre-V1 gadget is detected with 90%
confidence rate in the same function.
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C Instructions and registers inserted ran-
domly in the fuzzing technique
Table 3: Instructions and registers inserted randomly in the
fuzzing technique.
Instructions
add cmovll jns movzbl ror subl
addb cmp js movzwl sall subq
addl cmpb lea mul salq test
addpd cmpl leal nop sarq testb
addq cmpq leaq not sar testl
andb imul lock notq sal testq
andl incq mov or sbbl testw
andq ja movapd orl sbbq xchg
call jae movaps orq seta xor
callq jbe movb pop setae xorb
cmova je movd popq sete xorl
cmovaeq jg movdqa prefetcht0 shll xorq
cmovbe jle movl prefetcht1 shlq lfence
cmovbq jmp movq push shr sfence
cmovl jmpq movslq pushq sub mfence
cmovle jne movss rol subb
Registers
rax eax ax al xmm0 ymm0
rbx ebx bx bl xmm1 ymm1
rcx ecx cx cl xmm2 ymm2
rdx edx dx dl xmm3 ymm3
rsp esp sp spl xmm4 ymm4
rbp ebp bp bpl xmm5 ymm5
rsi esi si sil xmm6 ymm6
rdi edi di dil xmm7 ymm7
r8 r8d r8w r8b xmm8 ymm8
r9 r9d r9w r9b xmm9 ymm9
r10 r10d r10w r10b xmm10 ymm10
r11 r11d r11w r11b xmm11 ymm11
r12 r12d r12w r12b xmm12 ymm12
r13 r13d r13w r13b xmm13 ymm13
r14 r14d r14w r14b xmm14 ymm14
r15 r15d r15w r15b xmm15 ymm15
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Table 4: OpenSSL Analysis
Program Binary Size (KB) #Detected
libcrypto− lib−mem_sec.o 23 21
libcrypto− shlib−mem_sec.o 23 21
tls13secretstest−bin− packet.o 17 15
libcrypto− lib− ex_data.o 12 8
libcrypto− shlib− ex_data.o 12 8
lib f ips− lib− ex_data.o 12 8
liblegacy− lib− ex_data.o 12 8
libcrypto− lib−o_str.o 7.5 7
libcrypto− lib− params.o 13 7
libcrypto− lib− provider_core.o 26 7
libcrypto− lib− sparse_array.o 5.1 7
libcrypto− shlib−o_str.o 7.5 7
libcrypto− shlib− params.o 13 7
libcrypto− shlib− provider_core.o 26 7
libcrypto− shlib− sparse_array.o 5.1 7
lib f ips− lib−o_str.o 7.5 7
lib f ips− lib− params.o 13 7
lib f ips− lib− sparse_array.o 5.1 7
liblegacy− lib−o_str.o 7.5 7
liblegacy− lib− params.o 13 7
liblegacy− lib− sparse_array.o 5.1 7
libcrypto− lib− core_namemap.o 11 6
libcrypto− shlib− core_namemap.o 11 6
libcrypto− lib− context.o 8.3 5
libcrypto− lib− sel f _test_core.o 6.4 5
libcrypto− shlib− context.o 8.3 5
libcrypto− shlib− sel f _test_core.o 6.4 5
lib f ips− lib− context.o 6.1 5
lib f ips− lib− core_namemap.o 8.9 5
lib f ips− lib− sel f _test_core.o 6.2 5
liblegacy− lib− context.o 8.3 5
libcrypto− lib−asn1_dsa.o 4.8 4
libcrypto− lib−o_time.o 3.1 4
libcrypto− lib− packet.o 11 4
libcrypto− lib− param_build.o 16 4
libcrypto− shlib−asn1_dsa.o 4.8 4
libcrypto− shlib−o_time.o 3.1 4
libcrypto− shlib− packet.o 11 4
libcrypto− shlib− param_build.o 16 4
lib f ips− lib−asn1_dsa.o 4.8 4
lib f ips− lib− packet.o 11 4
lib f ips− lib− param_build.o 16 4
lib f ips− lib− provider_core.o 20 4
liblegacy− lib−asn1_dsa.o 4.8 4
liblegacy− lib− packet.o 11 4
liblegacy− lib− param_build.o 16 4
libssl− lib− packet.o 11 4
libssl− shlib− packet.o 11 4
libcrypto− lib−der_writer.o 6.2 3
libcrypto− lib− initthread.o 8.1 3
libcrypto− lib−mem.o 4.1 3
libcrypto− shlib−der_writer.o 6.2 3
libcrypto− shlib− initthread.o 8.1 3
libcrypto− shlib−mem.o 4.1 3
lib f ips− lib−der_writer.o 6.2 3
Program Binary Size (KB) #Detected
liblegacy− lib−der_writer.o 6.2 3
liblegacy− lib− initthread.o 8.1 3
libcrypto− lib− core_algorithm.o 2.3 2
libcrypto− lib− cryptlib.o 4.0 2
libcrypto− lib− param_build_set.o 3.9 2
libcrypto− lib− provider_con f .o 6.0 2
libcrypto− lib− threads_pthread.o 4.9 2
libcrypto− lib− x86_64cpuid.o 3.5 2
libcrypto− shlib− core_algorithm.o 2.3 2
libcrypto− shlib− cryptlib.o 4.0 2
libcrypto− shlib− param_build_set.o 3.9 2
libcrypto− shlib− provider_con f .o 6.0 2
libcrypto− shlib− threads_pthread.o 4.9 2
libcrypto− shlib− x86_64cpuid.o 3.5 2
lib f ips− lib− core_algorithm.o 2.3 2
lib f ips− lib− cryptlib.o 4.0 2
lib f ips− lib− param_build_set.o 3.9 2
lib f ips− lib− x86_64cpuid.o 3.5 2
liblegacy− lib− cryptlib.o 4.0 2
liblegacy− lib− param_build_set.o 3.9 2
liblegacy− lib− threads_pthread.o 4.9 2
liblegacy− lib− x86_64cpuid.o 3.5 2
libcrypto− lib− params_ f rom_text.o 5.2 1
libcrypto− shlib− params_ f rom_text.o 5.2 1
lib f ips− lib− params_ f rom_text.o 5.2 1
lib f ips− lib− threads_pthread.o 4.3 1
liblegacy− lib− params_ f rom_text.o 5.2 1
libcrypto− lib−bsearch.o 1.7 0
libcrypto− lib− core_ f etch.o 3.6 0
libcrypto− lib− cpt_err.o 3.2 0
libcrypto− lib− ctype.o 2.3 0
libcrypto− lib− cversion.o 4.2 0
libcrypto− lib− in f o.o 4.1 0
libcrypto− lib− init.o 13 0
libcrypto− lib−o_dir.o 2.4 0
libcrypto− lib− provider.o 4.1 0
libcrypto− lib− trace.o 5.4 0
libcrypto− lib−uid.o 1.5 0
libcrypto− shlib−bsearch.o 1.7 0
libcrypto− shlib− core_ f etch.o 3.6 0
libcrypto− shlib− cpt_err.o 3.2 0
libcrypto− shlib− ctype.o 2.3 0
libcrypto− shlib− cversion.o 4.2 0
libcrypto− shlib− in f o.o 4.1 0
libcrypto− shlib−o_dir.o 2.4 0
libcrypto− shlib− provider.o 4.1 0
libcrypto− shlib− trace.o 5.4 0
libcrypto− shlib−uid.o 1.5 0
lib f ips− lib−bsearch.o 1.7 0
lib f ips− lib− core_ f etch.o 3.6 0
lib f ips− lib− ctype.o 2.3 0
lib f ips− lib− initthread.o 4.3 0
liblegacy− lib−bsearch.o 1.7 0
liblegacy− lib− ctype.o 2.3 0
Total 777.2 379
21
